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Civil Liberties and the Canadian Constitution
GARY MURRAY KEYES "
For the most part, fundamental freedoms have been adequately
safeguarded in Canada, but there have been a number of disturbing
incidents in recent years. The Quebec Padlock Law of 1937, aimed at
preventing the propogation of Communism, also struck at freedom of
speech and religion;' the Alberta "Press Bill' of the same year, was
an attempt on the part of the state to restrict freedom of the press;2
the threatened deportation of Canadian citizens of Japanese origin in
1945,3 and arbitrary arrest and interrogation in the espionage in-
vestigation of 1946, all illustrate that the question of adequate pro-
tection of civil liberties is not an imaginary problem. Since the
adoption by the United Nations of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 4 there has been a growing conviction that certain civil
liberties would be better safeguarded by means of a constitutional
amendment to the British North America Act or by a solemn
statutory declaration of the federal Parliament. This conviction was
early exemplified in a speech by John Diefenbaker in the 1947 House
of Commons Debates in support of a Canadian Charter of Human
Rights, when he said that:
"a Bill of Rights ... would be a declaration delineating the field of
liberty that must be reserved to the individual against continuing invasion
on the part of the state."5
Now we are contemplating a manifestation of the views expressed
by Mr. Diefenbaker and many others, namely the federal Bill for the
Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms.6 We are asking ourselves just what rights we possess as
citizens? What do freedom of religion, of the press, of speech, and
association mean in Canadian law? Have we any guarantee of
equality before the law? Above all is there any value in trying to
draw up a Bill of Rights setting out the freedoms and rights we feel
the constitution should protect? Or is it wiser to let the judiciary
* Mr. Keyes is presently enrolled in the Third Year of the Osgoode Hall Law
School.1 See Communistic Propaganda Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 52, ss. 3, 12; Switzman
v. Elbling and A.G. of Quebec, [1957] S.C.R. 265.2 See Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100; [1939] A.C. 117:
3 See Co-Operative Committee on Japanese Candians v. A.G. for Canada,
[1947] A.C. 87 (P.C.).
4 For preliminary drafts and final text see (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 548,
1106 and (1949), 27 Can. Bar Rev. 203.
5 Canada, House of Commons Debates: 1947, vol. 4, at p. 3155.6 Bill C-60, first reading September 5, 1958; See Appendix "A" for full text.
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guard our civil liberties as has been the tradition in England for so
long?7 To answer these questions, it will be the burden of the first
part of this article to define the term "civil liberties", and determine
what protection they have been afforded by our written and unwritten
constitution and concomitant case law. The second part of this paper
shall deal with the jurisdiction of the proposed Bill of Rights as a
federal enactment, the meaning in law of some of its salient terms such
as "due process of law", and the comparative value of a statutory
enactment on civil liberties in the light of American and British
experience.
Part I-Traditional Safeguards of Our Rights and Liberties
A. The Meaning of The Term "Civil Liberties"
A leading writer on Constitutional Law, Professor F. R. Scott,
has put forth the view that the distinction between freedom and right
is without any real difference in law.8 In his view, there is no
freedom where there is no right. Freedom of speech involves the
absence of restraint upon the person enjoying the freedom, but it
must also involve a legal restraint upon all persons who would interfere
with that freedom, and these legal restraints come either from the
common law or from legislation.
It is suggested that these statements by Professor Scott are too
sweeping and only add to the confusion surrounding the interpretation
of the term "property and civil rights" in head 13 of section 92 of the
B.N.A. Act. Most writers in the field of jurisprudence distinguish
between a right and freedom. Indeed, a careful analysis indicates
that a right exists where there is positive law on the subject, a liberty
where there is no law against it. 9
A right is a correlative to a duty in another person, while a
liberty is not. The argument that rights and freedoms are the same
is usually based on the proposition that every one has a right not to
be interfered with in the exercise of his liberties. But, in fact, there
are two essentially different premises involved in this proposition:
the first means that he does not commit a legal wrong by doing
so-and-so, and the second means that you commit a legal wrong by
interfering with my doing so-and-so.1 0
Circumstances arise where there is a liberty to do something
without a right not to be interfered with in doing it One of the best
examples of a liberty or freedom unprotected by a corresponding
7See McD. Clokie, The Preservation of Civil Liberties (1947), 13, Can.
J. Eco. Pol. Sci. at 394.
s Scott, Dominion Jurisdiction over Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1949), 27 Can. Bar Rev. 497.
9 See generally, Storey v. Graham, [18991 1 Q.B. at p. 411 per Channel
L.J.; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. at p. 29 per Cave L.J.; Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions (1934), pp. 38-50; Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence(1937), 50 Harv. L. Rev. 557; Salmond on Jurisprudence, 10th ed. by G. L.
Williams (1947), 328.10 Williams, The Concept of Legal Liberty (1956), 56 Col. L. Rev. 1129.
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duty is freedom of speech. No one has a duty to listen to me. The
only duty might be the duty to gag me but this is part of the law
of torts. I have no right to be heard. Thus freedom of speech can
be regarded as the residium after subtracting all the particular duties
to refrain from sedition and slander, etc.
There is a dual significance in the jurisprudential distinction
between a right and freedom. On the one hand, it provides a natural
law basis for the judicial creation of certain absolute freedoms,"
"inherent rights of the Canadian citizen",-2 which are immune from
abridgment by the provinces of Canada, 13 and which include "freedom
of speech, religion and the inviolability of the person."'14 Indeed,
certain dicta exhorting an untrammelled publication of news and
political opinion15 might indicate that civil liberties are forbidden
powers implicit in the B.N.A. Act and incapable of abridgment by
either the provinces or the Dominion. On the other hand, the word
"rights" in civil rights has acquired a very special meaning in Canada
through its use to describe a particular area of provincial legislative
power in section 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act. As used there, the term
is primarily concerned with private law, the legal relationship
between persons in private life. The rights and liberties under dis-
cussion here are exclusively in the field of public law, defining
relationships between government and private persons.
The distinction between "civil liberties" and "rights" in head 13
of section 92 is crucial to the discussion in this paper. Too often it
has been assumed that the hereto usual characterizations of "civil
liberties" as "Property and Civil Rights" are not open to question,
and that, therefore, provincial legislation constitutionally can relate
directly to the individual's basic freedoms. The reasons for judgment
given by Rand and Kellock JJ. in the Saumur16 case, however, provide
solid support for a different, public law, basis of civil liberties.
Kellock J. in an excellent historical analysis of the origin of the
term "Property and Civil Rights" concludes that the Quebec Act of
1774, the Constitutional Act of 1791, the Act of Union of 1840 and
the Freedom of Worship Act of 1852 were not meant to fall within
the meaning of the phrase. In his opinion, the British North
11 Saumur v. The City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at p. 329, per Rand
J.; and see generally Price, Mr. Justice Rand and The Privileges and Im-
munities of Canadian Citizens (1958), 16 Fac. of L.R. pp. 25-27.
12 Reference re Exemption of U.S. Forces from Canadian Criminal Law
(1943), 80 Can. C.C. at pp. 214-5.
13 Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern Ltd.) and A.G. for New Brunswick, (1951)
4 D.L.R. 529, where Rand J. affirmed "A right or capacity to remain and to
engage in work in the Province."
14Saumur v. City of Quebec and A.G. of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 at
p. 329 where Rand J., said: "Strictly speaking, civil rights arise from positive
law; but freedom of speech, religion and the inviolability of the person are
original freedoms which are at once the necessary attributes and modes of
self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their com-
munity life within a legal order"; and see ex judicie writing, I.C. Rand,
The Right to Knowledge and Its Free Use (1954), Col. L Rev., 67.
15 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100 at pp. 132-134 per
Cannon J.; and Brewin: (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev., 234.1 6 Saumur v. City of Quebec, ante at pp. 325-356.
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America Act itself indicates 'that the subject matter of religious
profession is not a matter of provincial legislative jurisdiction within
any of the heads of section 92.17 Rand J. in the same case recognizes
that the statutory history of the expression "Property and Civil
Rights" demonstrates that such matters as "religious belief, duty and
observances were never intended to be included within the collocation
of powers."' 8  The recent dedision in Switzman v. ffbing19 provided
an opportunity for Kellock J. to reaffim this distinction between
"civil liberties" and "rights" of section 92(13).20 Rand J. in the
same case declares that the Quebec Padlock Law was "directed
against the freedom or civil liberty of the actor; no civil right...
is affected.... There is nothing of civil rights in this...."2
The importance, then, of this distinction between rights and
liberties throws into relief the true nature of the term civil rights
or civil liberties. Civil liberties in this connotation are distinguished
from all the other rights that individuals may enjoy under law
because they are specially buttressed in one way or another against
violation by governments. Civil liberties are also distinguishable from
political rights.22 Political rights are those which give adult citizens
the right to the franchise or qualify them to hold public office, and
so forth; civil liberties, on the other hand, are those which protect
individuals against political interference, and are not restricted to
citizens but are public rights. There are really two kinds of civil
liberties. First, there are the essential freedoms that men want for
their own sake. Secondly, there are procedural civil liberties. Both
kinds may be termed, civil liberties.2 3
B. The Constitutional Basis of Civil Liberties.
The function of the Supreme Court in Canada parallels in part
that of the Supreme Court in the United States in that both courts
interpret written constitutions and can declare ultra vires statutes
which are repugnant to their provisions. In Great Britain, no such
powers exist, as there are no legal limitations on the supremacy of
the British Parliament. Civil liberties in Great Britain legally are
quite vulnerable, yet it is generally felt that the rights and liberties
of the individual are better protected there than in the United States.
The cardinal reason perhaps is that the people of Great Britain have
17Ibid., at p. 347; and for further comments on the distinction see:
Citizens Insurance v. Parsons (1881), App. Cas. 96 (P.C.); Union Colliery v.
Bryden, [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.); A.G. Ont. 'v. H.S.R., [1903] S.C.R. 101.
28Ibid., at p. 329.
39 [1957] SC.R. 285.
20 bid., at p. 308.21 Ibid., at p. 305.
22 Ibid., at p. 306 where Kellock J. refers to his own judgment in Saumur
v. The City of Quebec, ante, and particularly to the statement therein pro-
duced from Mr. Justice Mignault's work, as follows: "Les droits sont les
facultes on avantages que les lois accordent aux personnes. Ils sont civils,
politiquies ou publics..."23 See generally, Corry, Democratic Government and Politics (1952),
Chapters 15 and 19.
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acquired a veneration for their statutory and common law rights
which is founded on a tradition of freedom under law and which
makes them jealous of threatened encroachments. 24
As indicated above, there has been a growing conviction in Canada
that traditional sodial and political safeguards are not sufficient and
that certain fundamental liberties should be specially protected, so
that they will not be at the mercy of any intolerant group in a
legislature or a cabinet. Aside from actual and threatened infractions
of civil liberties in recent years, one of the main reasons for the
inadequate protections referred to earlier is the uncertainty as to
which authority is responsible for their protection. Unlike the U.S.
Constitution, there are few legislative powers denied to both federal
and provincial governments. It is generally argued that each is
supreme within the limits of power conferred and that there is
nothing which is beyond the reach of either federal or provindial
law-making authority.2 5 It should be noted, however, that certain
observations of Rand J. in the Switzman case, do not support this
generally accepted proposition. In his opinion neither the provincial
nor the federal authorities can destroy the "constitutional structure",
itself. If this is so, power to do so therefore is forbidden and beyond
the federal and provincial law-making authorities.26
Nevertheless, the main question for determination here is whether
civil liberties are in the exclusive domain of the federal government
or of the provinces or whether they are in a common field of legis-
lation?
A convenient grouping of civil liberties for subsequent analysis
is as follows:
(1) freedom of the press and speech
(2) freedom of religion
(3) freedom of the person from interference, or security of the
person and freedom of association.
This list is by no means exhaustive. It will be used as a basis for
examining the protection presently afforded civil liberties by the
Canadian constitution.
(1) Freedom of the Press and Speech
After the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688-9, the infamous Licensing
Acts2 7 fell into disuse. Thus legislature and administrative inaction
laid the basis for freedom of the press. But it should be observed
that this does not mean that anyone can say or write whatever he
wishes with impunity. If his statements are seditious, libellous or
24See generally, Mad. Dawson, The Government of Canada (1952),
Chapter 10.
25Per Lord Loreburn in A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Canada, [19121 A.C. 571 (P.C.)
at p. 581: "there can be no doubt that under this organic instrument the
powers distributed between the Dominion . . . and the provinces . . . cover
the whole area of self-government within... Canada."2 6 Switzman v. ElbZing, ante at p. 307, and see Murphy v. C.P.R., [1958]
S.C.R. 626 at p. 643 per Rand J.27 25 Henry VIII, c. 15 (1533); 14 Charles II, c. 33 (1662).
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slanderous, he is liable to be punished under the criminal code or
provincial statutes.28 It is, thus only in the residium after subtract-
ig the particular duties imposed by the state, that freedom of the
press exists.
The right to receive and disseminate information is of paramount
importance in a democratic state. Of exceptional interest in this
regard is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Boucher v.
The King,29 where sedition was defined so as to remove the danger
of the Criminal Code, at the hands of the state in times of crisis,
being used to repress freedom of expression in political and religious
affairs. In this case, Aimd Boucher, a Quebec farmer, distributed
leaflets, published by the Witnesses of Jehovah, containing a vigor-
ously worded protest against what was described as the hateful
persecutions of Christians caused by "priest domination." On the
first hearing of the appeal, five judges of the Supreme Court ordered
a new trial. Application was then made, and granted, to have the
appeal reargued before a full Court of nine judges. It was held
(Rinfret C.J.C., Taschereau, Cartwright and Fauteux JJ. dissenting),
that Boucher be acquitted as there was no evidence either in the
pamphlet or otherwise upon which a jury, properly instructed, could
find him guilty of the offence charged.
The main interest of this case lies in the conflict of views as
to the proper definition of sedition. A seditious libel was stated in
section 133(2) of the Criminal Code (1927) to be a libel expressive
of seditious intent. The Court had to resort to the common law of
England as the Code contained no definition of "seditious intent."
The Court rejected the definition in Stephen's Digest of Criminal
Law in respect to two clauses: a seditious intention is an inten-
tion (i) "to bring into hatred or contempt or to incite disaffection
against . . . the administration of justice", and (ii) "to promote
feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of His
Majesty's subjects." 30 It was finally held that neither language
calculated to promote feelings of ll-will and hostility between different
classes of His Majesty's subjects nor criticizing the courts is seditious
unless there is the intention to incite to violence or resistance to or
defiance of constituted authority.
This decision is highly significant. There can be no more power-
ful weapon for the suppression of freedom than vague definitions of
sedition and like offences. Locke J. points out that after 1689 the
press was exploited in the party warfare when the party (in power
tried to crush its opponents by prosecuting as seditious libels all
publications which supported the opposition. Giving a further state-
ment of the right of free public discussion, Mr. Justice Locke said:
28 See The Canadian Criminal Code, 1953-54, 2-3 Elizabeth II, (Can.), c. 51;
publication of material in aid of offences against the Code: s. 123, s. 177(1) (f),
s. 179(1) (a), s. 403(1) (a); false advertising: s. 306; material declared offen-
sive: s. 150, s. 151, s. 246, ss. 247-267; An Act respecting Publications and
Public Morals, 1950, (Que.) c. 12, amen. 1950-51 (Que.) c. 13, and The Libel
and Slander Act, (1958) c. 51 (Ont.).
29 [1951] S.C.R. 265, varying on re-hearing, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657; Brewin:
(1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 193.30 Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, 8th ed., at p. 94.
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"The right of free public discussion upon all matters affecting the state
and its government, subject only to the restraint imposed by the laws
both civil and criminal as to defamation, and in the case of the adminis-
tration of justice to the law as to contempt of court, has long since become
firmly established."31
It is the right, he concludes, of His Majesty's subjects to criticize
freely the manner in which the government of the country is carried
on, the conduct of those administering the government, and the justice
that is carried out.
In discussing the liberties which vest in the people, and, the free
play of ideas, Mr. Justice Rand stated, in the spirit of the great free
speech opinions of Holmes and Brandeis, that:
"Freedom of thought and speech and disagreement in ideas and beliefs,
on every conceivable subject, are of the essence of our life. The clash of
critical discussion on political, social and religious subjects has too deeply
become the stuff of daily experience to suggest that mere ill-will as a
product of controversy can strike down the latter with illegality."3 2
The same basic constitutional problem arose in the Reference re
Alberta Statutes.33 The Supreme Court of Canada there invalidated
the Alberta Press Bill which had been enacted by the newly-elected
Social Credit government as a measure to curtail adverse criticism
in the press of its unorthodox financial programme. It should be
stated at the outset that the decision :n that reference taken in its
strict ratio was simply that the Bill in question, being part of, and
dependent upon, a general scheme of social credit legislation already
invalidated on other constitutional grounds, fell with the other
legislation.
The decision in the Alberta Press case, is germane here, however,
because of the illuminating analysis, by three members of the Court,
of the relationship between our constitution ("similar in principle
to that of the United Kingdom") our parliamentary institutions and
freedom of expression. Sir Lyman P. Duff, then Chief Justice of
Canada, was of the opinion that in addition to the federal power of
disallowance, the Dominion alone had power to legislate for the
protection of the right of free public discussion, and that it was beyond
the powers of the Provinces to abrogate the right of public debate or
suppress Its exercise in public meetings or through the medium of the
press. 34 The terms in which the Chief Justice (with whom Mr.
Justice Davis concurred), spoke were sufficiently broad to embrace
federal protection of civil liberties connected with the operation of
provindial parliamentary institutions.
A similar view is expressed by Cannon J.:
" .. no political party can elect a prohibitory barrier to prevent the
electors from getting information concerning the policy of the Govern.
ment .... There must be an untrammelled publication of the news and
31 Boucher v. The King, ante p. 330.
32 Ibid., at p. 288.
33 [1938] S.C.R. 100; [1939] A.C. 117; and see Laskin: (1941), 19 Can.
Bar Rev. 49; Nichols: (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 1001; Brewin: (1957), 35
Can. Bar Rev. 554.
34 Ibid., at pp. 132-134.
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political parties contending for ascendancy ... the federal parliament is
the sole authority to curtail, if deemed expedient and in the public
interest, the freedom of the press in discussing public affairs and the
equal rights in that respect of all citizens throughout the Dominion."3 5
Cannon J. also made another highly significant observation. He
threw out the idea that Canadian citizens enjoy freedom of expression
as an incident or piivilege of their citizenship status.3 6 This idea was
later picked up, though without acknowledgment, by Rand J. in his
remarks on the freedom to move from place to place in the Winner
case:
cc. a province cannot prevent a Canadian from entering it except,
conceivably.., for some local reason."37
In view of the fact that other reasons were given to strike down
the impugned Alberta Statutes, the remarks of the Court on civil
liberties were obiter and do not conclusively settle their general con-
stitutional basis. One half of the Court dealt with freedom of the
press and speech and each gave different reasons. According to Duff
C.J.C., the provinces cannot abridge freedom of speech because the
B.N.A. Act contemplates "a Constitution similar in principle to that
of the United Kingdom", the basis of which are Parliamentary institu-
tions, to which free discussion is vital. Now an important constitu-
tional rule of the British Constitution is parliamentary supremacy.
The British Parliament can validly abrogate any civil liberty. Does
this mean that the federal Parliament can validly abrogate freedom
of discussion? According to Abbott J. in Switzman v. Elbling,
Parliament itself cannot (except by a process of constitutional
amendment) destroy freedom of discussion in peace-time. The B.N.A.
Act is, in the opinion of Abbott J., based on:
"the right of candidates for Parliament or for a legislature, and of
citizens generally, to explain, criticize, debate and discuss in the freest
possible manner such matters as the qualifications, the policies and the
political and economic and social principles advocated by such candidates
or by the political parties or groups of which they can be members."
In this interpretation of the B.N.A. Act, the learned judge finds
certain constitutional guarantees of freedom implicit and incapable
of abridgment by either the provincial or federal government. This
conclusion, if well founded, has merit. It, would mean that civil
liberties could validly be regarded as forbidden powers, at least in
normal times, giving the courts a sound basis for invalidating pro-
vincial or federal legislation directly relating to such liberties. It
would assist the judiciary in discharging its function as guardian of
the individual's rights and freedoms. The initial question of which
authority has the constitutional right to legislate on civil liberties
would have been settled, and the courts could proceed as invited to
define the boundaries of these freedoms.
35 Ibid., at pp. 146-147.
36 Ibid., at p. 149.
37 Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern Ltd.), [19511 S.C.R. 887 at p. 920.
38 [19571 S.C.R. 285; Brewin: (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 554; Cooper: (1954),
1 McGill L.J. 281.
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Abbott J.'s conclusion, however, is open to question on two main
grounds. In the first place, the dedisions of the majority of several
members of the Court were severely limited. Kerwin C.J.C., Locke,
Cartwright, Fauteux and Nolan JJ., found as the sole ground for
striking down the infamous Padlock Act of Quebec4O that its effect
was to make criminal the propagation of communism. It was not
legislation in relation to "property and civil rights in the Province or
in relation to matter of a merely private or local nature in the
province" (notwithstanding the dissent of Taschereau J.). It was
criminal legislation under the exclusive control of the federal Parlia-
ment. Therefore, the observations of Rand J. (with whom Kellock J.
concurred), and Abbott J. go far beyond what was necessary for the
dedisior. In this regard, it should be noted that Rand J. did not go
as far as Abbott J.: he nowhere says there is a forbidden power
except when it comes to tampering with what he calls the "consti-
tutional structure." Secondly, the learned judge bases his observa-
tion that freedom -of expression is a forbidden power on the judgment
of Duff C.J.C. in the Alberta Reference. It has already been suggested
that since only one half of the Court in that case expressed an opinion
on its civil liberties aspects, no binding conclusions should be based
on it; this is especially so as other reasons were given by all the
judges to stike down the questioned legislation.
Taken together or singly, it is submitted that the foregoing
decisions do not conclusively settle the constitutional basis for freedom
of expression, although they may work in favour of the parliament
of Canada. Because of this unsettled state of the law, it would be
rash to conclude that there as a bill of rights safeguarding freedom
of expression embodied in the B.N.A. Act. There is, therefore, a
need for judicial clarification of the status of this civil liberty; such
a clarification, moreover, may be facilitated, rather than Impaired, by
the introduction of the proposed Bill of Rights.
(2) Freedom of Religion
Aside from Sunday legislation and the separate schools question,
the issue of freedom of religion was, prior to 1953, never clearly
defined in our Court of last resort. In that year, the case of Saumur
v. The City of Quebec and the A.-G. of Quebec41 finally reached the
Supreme Court -of Canada. This case concerned the constitutional
validity of a by-law of Quebec City under which a Jehovah's Witness
had been convicted of distributing pamphlets without the prior per-
mission of the police chief as required by the by-law. The Supreme
Court, by a five-to-four vote, held that the by-law did not apply to
prevent the defendant, as a member of the Jehovah's witnesses, from
distributing tracts in Quebec City streets.
39 Ibid., at p. 327.
40 R.S.Q., 1941, c. 52.
41 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Laskin, Our Civil Liberties (1954), 61 Queen's
Quarterly, 455; Chalmers: (1954), 12 U. of T. School of L.R. 12; Howe:(1948), 27 Can. Bar Rev. 1248.
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As a result of the division of opinion, the position of the civil
liberty of freedom of religion is unsettled and unsatisfactory. A
majority of the Court, Kerwin, Rand, Kellock, Estey and Locke, JJ.,
held that the legislation authorizing the by-law was beyond the
competence of the provincial legislature as an interference with
religious freedom and not a matter of property and civil rights.42
They relied on the dicta of Duff C.J.C. and Cannon J. in the Reference
re Alberta Statutes. In essence, four judges of the majority viewed
the legislation as pertaining to censorship of religion, and, by anology
to censorship of press, they felt this to be a strictly federal matter.
Although the Court was not called upon to decide whether religion
itself was a subject matter under the legislative competence of the
Parliament of Canada, it can be inferred from the reasons given that
such is the case.
Kerwin J. as he then was, seems to support the majority, but
in fact his explicit disapproval of Duff C.J.C.'s dicta in the Alberta
Reference case indicates that he considered freedom of religion (and
presumably of the press) as controlled by provincial legislature under
head 13 of section 92 of the B.N.A. Act. The by-law in question
did not apply, in his view, to the action of the accused in distributing
religious literature because of the Freedom of Worship Act which
granted religious freedom in the provinces. To all intents and
purposes, Kerwin J. decided with Rinfret C.J.C., Taschereau and
Fauteux JJ., that freedom of worship was not a subject of legislation
within the jurisdiction of Parliament but instead was a civil right in
the province and subject to the control of provincial legislatures.
The reasons given by Cartwright J. In agreeing with the minority
are significant. He finds the true nature of the legislation to be
related to the use of streets; though it might affect freedom of religion,
it was not in relation to freedom of religion. In future tests of how
far freedom of religion is beyond the competence of the provinces,
the use of this aspect theory by Cartwright J. (with whom Fauteux
concurred) would not deprive either judge from holding that legisla-
tion aimed at restricting religious freedom is beyond the power of the
Province. This characterization of the legislation by Cartwright J.
may reflect his view of the constitutional basis of civil liberties, or it
may mean that he simply has not made up his mind, or that, having
regard to the explosive nature of the case and the obvious split
between the Roman Catholic-Protestant judges, he adopted a more
compromising position. In an important constitutional case like this,
Cartwright J.'s position may illustrate a rough analogy between court
solidarity and the cabinet solidarity of the federal government.
Perhaps Cartwright J., as an English-speaking Protestant, purposely
sided with the minority to prevent showing a split in the Supreme
Court to the world at large on racial and religious grounds!
42 But see the judgment of Kerwin 5. who based his reasons on a differ-
ent ground.
43 [1955] S.C.R. 799.
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If civil liberties have no independent constitutional ground, it
would be easy to find its aspect to be in relation to highways or
matters of local interest. If, however, civil liberties have an inde-
pendent constitutional basis, as indicated by the views expressed by
Duff C.J.C. and Cannon J. in the ATherta Reference and by Rand,
Kellock, Estey, Locke JJ. in the Birk's case, freedom of religion has
some measure of protection.4 3 In the writer's opinion, these basic
liberties would recdive more assured protection under federal author-
ity in the light of previous provincial abridgments. As it is now,
protection varies unevenly from province to province. Therefore just
as criminal law was placed under federal authority to ensure uni-
formity of justice to all the citizens of Canada, similarly, jurisdiction
over fundamental liberties should repose in the federal law-making
authority.
In Henry Birk's & Sons Ltd., v. Montreal and A.-G. of Quebec,44
the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held to be ultra vires an
amendment passed in 1949 by the Quebec legislature to the Early
Closing Act of that province and the subsequent Montreal by-law
which required the closing on specified Catholic Feast-days, of all
retail stores in the city. The real purpose of the legislation, the
Court held, was not to provide additional holidays for retail employees
under section 92 (13), (15) or (16), but to enforce observance of
days because of their religious significance. The legislation, being
analogous to Sunday observance laws, was competent only to the
Parliament of Canada under section 91(27), "Criminal Law", in the
opinions of Kerwin, C.J.C., Fauteux, Taschereau, Estey, Cartwright,
and Abbott JJ.
The case is a reminder of the unsettled state of the law as to the
seat of legislative power relating to aspects of religion other than
Sunday observance. Rand J., referring to his reasons in Saumur,
expressed the opinion that the legislation related to religion and there-
fore was beyond provincial competence. Kellock and Locke JJ. agreed
that the legislation was analogous to Sunday observance legislation,
which had always been part of the criminal law, but also saw the
by-law as legislation respecting freedom of religion as dealt with by
earlier statutes. This case then goes some way towards making
religious freedom a separate head immune to provincial interference;
further inferences are less compelling.
(3) Freedom of the Person and Freedom of Association
A person cannot be detained or penalized for what he has said
on some vague ground that it is unwise in the public interest or
unfair generally. A charge must be laid alleging violation of a
specific law. Freedom of the person is secured in the same way.
The common law, supplemented by statute, defines the offences for
which a man may be convicted and 'imprisoned. The individual who
infringes none of these laws, enjoys freedom of person.
44 Ibid., and see Brewin: (1956), 34 Can. Bar Rev. 81; Castor: (1956), 14
Fac. of L.R. 105.
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Anyone, however, may find himself arrested on suspicion of a
crime. But here the law provides limitations. The Petition of Right
in 1628 protects the person agalnst arbitrary arrest. In 1763 a series
of civil actions established the illegality of general warrants of
arrest.45 The Criminal Code forbids a blank warrant and attempts to
avoid the abuse of the power of arrest and seizure.46 If an arrested
person is not formally charged and tried speedily for some specific
offence, he can secure his release on habeas corpus.47
Another safeguard of personal freedom is the right to sue for
damages for assault, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment
when public officials exceed their lawful powers of arrest and deten-
tion The recent decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Lamb
v. Benoit48 affords an instance of judicial vigilance in protecting
freedom of the person. In this case, a Jehovah's Witness recovered
damages against the local police for false arrest, false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution. The appellant was charged with the
distribution of a publication alleged at the time to be seditious libel.
In the words of Rand J.:
The arrest and prosecution were quite without justification or excuse and
the detention. .. carried out in a manner and in conditions little short of
disgraceful..."
The shocking aspect of this case was the attempt by the police
to force the appellant to sign a waiver of all claims for false arrest by
threatening to charge her with promulgation of a seditious libel. The
case exemplifies our dependence on the judiciary in protecting the
security of persons especially against the abuse of authority by public
officials.4 9 Of special note was the court's obvious vigilance in
delineating the bounds of a police officer's authority to lay a criminal
information. The court was unable to agree that certain statutes
relied on by Benoit, a special constable of the Quebec Provincial
Police, could give umbrage where there is lack of "good faith" in
prosecuting. In the words of Locke J.:
"The mere bona fide belief that he has power to do the act complained
of is not enough; he must believe in facts which give him the power if
they existed.... As to Benoit, without any lawful justification, he caused
the arrest and imprisonment of the appellant and was responsible for the
laying of the information and prosecution which followed. The appellant
was subjected to the ignominy of arrest and prosecution for the offence
of distributing a seditious libel, of which offence Benoit knew from the
outset she was innocent..."
4 5 Leach v. Money (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1002; Wilkes v. Wood (1763), 19 St.
Tr. 1154.
46 1953-54, 2-3 Eliz. II, (Can.) ss. 429-445.
4 7 Habeas Corpus Acts: 1640, 16 Can. 1 c. 10; R.S.O., 1950, c. 163; R.S.N.B.,
1952, c. 101; R.S.N.S., 1954, c. 1M7; R.S.P.E.I., 1951, c. 70; and Can. Cr. Code,
s. 680.
48 [1959] S.C.R. (this case is unreported at the time of writing, but
reasons for judgment were delivered in January 1959) and see also Kennedy
v. Tomlinson, an appeal concerning malicious prosecution of an alleged
vagrant, heard by the Ontario Court of Appeal on the 30th of March, 1959,
and as yet unreported).
4 9 See dicta of Boyd C. in Toothe v. Frederick, 14 P.R. 287.
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Freedom of association lis a public right within the competence
of the federal parliament. By defining seditious conspiracies and
unlawful assemblies, the Criminal Code permits all other' kinds of
associations which do not come within these restrictions. 50 Though
the provinces may validly enact legislation to regulate the use of
parks and public places under section 92(13) and (16) of the B.N.A.
Act, the extent of this power seems limited by the Criminal Code.
The power to declare an assembly unlawful could be abused but
there appear to be no cases on the relevant section -of the Code.51
Part If-The Proposed Bill of Rights
A. Federal Jurisdiction
The B.N.A. Acts do not contain a Bill of Rights as does the U.S.
constitution. To a large extent, the civil liberties outlined in Part I
above remain at the mercy of the appropiate legislature. Never-
theless some matters which have important implications for civil
liberties are guaranteed in the B.N.A. Act and are put beyond the
reach of either Dominion or provincial legislatures. The use of
English and French languages is guaranteed by section 133; the right
to separate schools by section 93; the right to a new parliament
every five years by section 50; the right to an annual session of
parliament by section 20; section 99 ensures security of tenure of
office for the judges of the Superior Courts in the province and thus
protects the right to an independent judiciary.
Since the proposed Bill of Rights was announced in September,
1958, many commentators have decried its utility as a mere statutory
enactment and have called for its incorporation into the B.N.A. Act.
Such an amendment would have the effect of making the prescribed
rights more secure against legislative repeal. Civil liberties so
entrenched would restrict the jurisdiction of legislatures and enable
the Courts to set aside subsequent statutes impinging thereon. How-
ever, we are confronted with a Bill of Rights which is a federal
statute settng out, like the English Bill of Rights of 1689, cardinal
rights and liberties of Canadian citizens. Instead of extolling the
value of a Bill of Rights as an amendment to the B.N.A. Act, it is
suggested that it is more useful if we recognize the proposed federal
enactment as a "fait accompli" and attempt to assess its constitutional
basis and the legal implications of some of its terms. This approach,
it is submitted, is more realistic in the light of the large majority
supporting the government proposing the Bill.
A Bill of Rights such as that proposed will not bind future parlia-
ments, although it will bind subsequent governments. It can be
amended or abrogated by a mere majority vote. Whether future
enactments could impliedly abridge or infringe any of the rights or
freedoms recognized dn Part 1 of the Bill is an open question. Section
50 Ss. 60 and 64.
51 See Ryan, More About a Bill of Rights (1958), 1 Can. Bar J. 74; and
Chaput v. Romain, [1955] S.C.R. 834.
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3 of the Bill directs that all future acts and regulations shall not be
so construed. In England, the power of a 'sovereign' legislature to
repeal by implication any previously existing legislation has been
strongly relied upon as establishing the proposition that the courts
there could never inquire into the validity of an Act of Parliament
since the power of Parliament to amend both the substance of the
law and the manner of its working are uncircumscribed. The
significance of the power of implicit repeal may be illustrated by two
cases: Vauxhall Estates v. Liverpool Corporation52 and Ellen Street
Estates v. Minister of Healt. 53 In the latter, Maugham L.J. refers
to the constitutional position that Parliament can alter an Act
previously passed, and dt can do so by repealing in express terms the
previous Act, and it can do so in another way, "namely by enacting
a provision which is clearly inconsistent wvith the previous Act."
Maughan L.J. concluded:
"The legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to
the form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to
enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject matter
there can be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent Act, Parliament
chooses to make plain that the earlier statute is being to some extent
repealed, effect must be given to that intention just because it is the
will of the legislature."
The language of Maugham L.J. is emphatic but how far do these
propositions extend? If the federal Bill of Rights is based on a valid
constitutional basis, according to the propositions laid down by
Maugham L.J., valid subsequent federal legislation could impliedly
repeal the rights protected by the Bill of Rights.M
The real strength of the Bill aside from a valid constitutional
basis, resides in the solemnity of the occasion on which it is adopted
and the symbolic nature of its provisions. This is the touchstone
which will guide judicial interpretation and give effect to section 3.
In the Nova Scotia Delegation55 case, Rand J. observed that the
delegation of power over federal subject matters to provincial legis-
lators, though not an absolute transfer of power, might prove
impossible to revoke if people get used to having it exercised by
provincial legislators, as the power may vest in the form of a consti-
tutional convention. This vesting argument of Mr. Justice Rand's
might work in favour of the Bill of Rights, so that future Parliaments
would hesitate to expressly repeal any of its provisions and the courts
would be reluctant to construe subsequent legislation as impliedly
repealing any of the terms of the Bill of Rights.
In Part I of this article an attempt was made to trace the protec-
tions afforded civil liberties and to locate their constitutional basis.
By analysis of the cases on freedom of speech, press and religion, it
was seen that the Courts tend to reject provincial infringements of
52 [1932J 1 K.B. 733.
53 [1934] 1 K.B. 590.
54See Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty And The Commonwealth(1957), p. 35.
55A.G. Nova Scotia v. A.G. of Canada, [1950] 4 D.L.R. 369 at p. 387.
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basic liberties but only impliedly place their constitutional basis in the
Dominion. Dicta of the Supreme Court have been interpreted in
some quarters as establishing that an implied bill of rights has been
written into the B.N.A. Act in such a way as to be beyond the reach
of both the Dominion and provinces.
What should concern us here is the area of federal jurisdiction
over the proposed Bill. To put the question another way, are the
liberties enumerated in Part I of the Bill within the exclusive domain
of Parliament or of the provinces? The B.N.A. Act distributes
legislative authority between the federal and provincial governments;
it allocates all powers of government to one or other of the authorities.
As Lord Loreburn has said:
"there can be no doubt that under this organic instrument the powerdistributed between the Dominion on the one hand, and the provinces on
the other covers the whole area of self-government within ... Canada.
It should be subversive of the entire scheme and policy of the Act to
assume that any point of internal self-government was withheld fromCanada."56
Therefore, since there are no legislative powers denied to the
Dominion and provincial governments, there can be no forbidden
powers such as civil liberties and no implied bill of rights beyond
the competence of both the Dominion and provinces.
The usual method of locating the constitutional basis of challenged
legislation is to inquire whether it falls within any of the heads of
section 92 of the B.N.A. Act. If it does not, it is exclusively federal
under the general and residuary powers in section 91. If the impugned
law also falls within section 92, we must apply certain canons of
interpretation. We may be able to apply the rule of mutual modifica-
tion;57 or seek the leading feature of the challenged law.58 If we
cannot find a leading feature, and the Dominion and provinces
legislate on the same matter under different aspects, there being an
inconsistency, the Dominion's power prevails under the general power
to make laws "for the peace, order and good government of Canada." 59
It should be noted that in this dual aspect situation the mere fact
the Dominion does not legislate, the provincial legislation is not ipsofacto, intra vires as it can be overriden by the Dominion.60  With
these rules of interpretation in mind, we can now consider whether
the federal Parliament has jurisdiction to enact a statute dealing
with fundamental freedoms and human rights under the peace order
and good government clause of section 91 of the B.N.A. Act.
The civil liberties of Part I of the proposed bill are, it is submitted,
the public rights of all Canadian citizens. They should not be
characterized under the private law concepts of property and civil
56A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Canada, [19121 A.C. 571 (P.C.) at p. 581.57 Citizen's Insurance v. Parsons (1881), App. Cas. 96 (P.C.).58 Union Colliery v. Bryden, [18991 A.C. 580 (P.C.).
59 A. G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., [18941 A.C. 189.6OSee especially, Kennedy, The Interpretation of the British NorthAmerica Act (1943), 8 Camb. L.J. 146; MacDonald, The Canadian Constitution
Seventy Years After (1937), 15 Can. Bar Rev. 401.
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rights or as matters of merely local or private importance to the
province. Taken in their broad sense, as public rights, they are not
obviously related directly to any single specific head of section 91.
They, therefore, belong to the Parliament of Canada, to which is
assigned the general and residuary power to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of Canada on all subjects not exclusively
assigned to the provinces.61
Even if this submission were entirely acceptable, we would still
be faced with the somewhat empty facade of the residuary power.6 2
Judicial interpretations from 1896 to 1946 have reduced the residuary
clause significantly. From 1867 to 1896 the Privy Council construed
parliament's powers broadly, giving full value to the general power.63
From 1896 judicial interpretation worked a contraction of these
powers in defence to the provincial powers in section 92.64 Under
the "emergency" doctrine propounded by Lord Chancellor Haldane,
the Dominion's general power could be used only in periods of national
emergency such as war.65
Recent cases, however, indicate that the federal general power
may be expanding. In A.-G. Ont. vu. Canada Temperance Federation,
Lord Simon found the test of the scope of the general power:
"to be in the real subject matter of the legislation: if it is such that it
goes beyond local or provincial concern or interests and must from its
inherent nature be the concern of the Dominion as a whole.., then it
will fall within the competence of the Dominion Parliament as a matter
affecting the peace, order and good government of Canada, though it
may in another aspect touch upon matters specially reserved to the
Provincial Legislatures."66
This, of course, is a return to the Russell test. It should be remem-
bered, nevertheless, that Lord Simon's "inherent nature" test was
partially curtailed by the Margarine Case.67 In that case, Lord
Morton held that Lord Simon's test must be considered in the light
of Lord Atkin's observations in the Labour Conventions case, so that
abnormal circumstances are required for the federal general power
to justify overriding head 13 of section 92. Lord Morton's remarks
61 See Laskin, Peace, Order and Good Government Re-examined (1947),
25 Can. Bar Rev. 1054; Laskin (1957), 35 Can. Bar Rev. 101.62 MacDonald, The Privy Council and the Canadian Constitution (1951),
29 Can. Bar Rev. 1021; Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court
of and for Canadians (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1038.
63 Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829 at p. 839, per Sir Montague
E. Smith: "Few, if any, laws could be made by parliament for the peace,
order and good government of Canada which did not in some incidental way
affect property and civil rights; and it could not have been intended, when
assuring to the provinces exclusive legislative authority on the subjects of
property and civil rights, to exclude the parliament from the exercise of this
general power whenever any such incidental interference would result from it.
64 See A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can., [18963 A.C. 348, 359-61 (P.C.); In Re Board
of Commerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.); Toronto Electric Commissioners V.
Snider, [19253 A.C. 396 (P.C.); Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians
v. Canada, [1947] A.C. 87 (P.C.).65 In Re Board of Commerce Act, [1922] 1 A.C. 191 (P.C.); Toronto Elec-
trio Commission v. Snider, [1925] A.C. 396 (P.C.).
66 [1946] A.C. 193 (P.C.).
67 Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [19513
A.C. 179.
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may be taken, then, as a caveat against too liberal an approach to
what is of national concern.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court of Canada, in the first
major decision on this problem after the abolition of appeals to the
Privy Council, followed Lord Simon's "inherent nature" test in the
Johannesson case,68 instead of the Watson-Haldane-Duff approach
developed in the Local Prohibition case, the Snider case, the Natural
Products case, and the Margarine case. And even more recently ajudge of the Ontario High Court of Justice in Pronto Uranium Mines
v. O.L.R.B., expliditly chose to rely on the Canada Temperance test
which might indicate that the "peace, order and good government"
clause of section 91 is only a "sleeping giant." These recent cases
provide ample justification for what easily could (and should) be
an expansion of the federal power to include the proposed Bill of
Rights. What could be, by its very nature, of greater concern to
the Dominion as a whole than the protection of those liberties which
are the primary condition of social life, thought and communication?
B. An Interpretation of Some of the Terms of the Bill of Rights
In Part I of this article, cases pertaining to freedom of speech,
press, association, religion and person were analyzed to locate their
constitutional basis. Despite varying opinions, one conclusion can
reasonably be deduced: all leading dicta place jurisdiction over civil
liberties beyond the competence of the provinces. These cases will
be highly persuasive in future judicial interpretations of civil liberties
as modified in section 2 of -the Bill of Rights.
Future difficulties, however, Will be met in the interpretation of
other sections and terms of the Bill. This is especially true of section
2(a) and (b):
"2. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
always existed, and shall continue to exist, the following human rights
and fundamental freedoms; namely,(a) The right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and
enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof
except by due process of law.(b) The right of the individual to the protection of the law without
discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or
sex;"
Fortunately, many of these terms are similar to those used in the
U.S. Bill of Rights. Assistance, therefore, may be derived for future
Canadian interpretation from the U.S. case law, especially with regard
to the phrases "due process of law" and "protection of the law...
without discrimination."
(1) Due Process of Law
(a) Historical Origins.
The phrase "due process of law" comes from an early Edward
II statute, reading as follows:
68 Johannesson v. West St. PauW, [19521 S.C.R. 292.69 [1956) 5 D.L.R. (2nd) 342.
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"No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out of his lands
or tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to
death, without he brought to answer by due process of law."70
This statute in turn relates back to the famous chapter 39 of the
Magna Carta:
"No freedman shall be captured or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed
or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go against him or send
against him, except by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land."71
The important phrase in chapter 39 ds "by the law of the land",
which is made by Coke synonymous with the latin phrase, "by due
process of law"; and that in turn Coke equates to "due process of the
Common law", that is, "the indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men .. .or writ original of the common law." Historical
evidence, however, shows that Coke did not regard "the law of the
land", as he defined it, as beyond the power of parliamentary altera-
tion.7 2 Nor did the early colonial constitutions after 1776, in which
the phrase "law of the land" applies, import any limitation on legis-
lative power.73
"Law of the Land" and "Due Process of Law", however, derive
their contemporary importance from their character as restrictions
upon legislation in general. This function is significant in U.S. con-
stitutional law because of the sweeping powers of judicial review
exercised by the Supreme Court.
(b) U.S. JudiciaZ Interpretation.
The phrase "due process of law" has had a chequered history in
U.S. judicial interpretation. It appears in the federal Constitution in
two separate amendments. The first ten amendments embodying the
Bill of Rights were intended to curb all branches of the federal
Government in the fields touched by the amendments-Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial. The Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments
were pointedly aimed at confining the exerdise of power by courts
and judges within precise boundaries, particularly in the procedure
used for trial of criminal cases. The Fifth amendment required
indictment by Grand Jury in many criminal trials, prohibits double
jeopardy, self-incrimination, deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law or the taking of property for public use
without just compensation. Fears of arbitrary court action sprang
largely from the past use of courts in the imposition of criminal
punishments to suppress speech, press, and religion. Hence the con-
stitutional limitations of court powers were essential supplements to
the First Amendment which was itself designed to ensure the widest
70 28 Edw. IT, c. 3.
71 See McKechnie, Magna Carta (2nd rev. ed. 1914) at p. 28.
7 2 Inst. II, 50-1; and see generally Jenks, The Myth of Magna Carta
(1904), Indep. Rev. 206; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law (1938), at p.
174.
7 3 Thorpe, American Charters.
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scope for all people to believe and to express the most divergent
political, religious and other views.74
But these limitations were not expressly imposed upon state court
action. In 1833, Barron v. Baltimore,75 held that the first eight
amendments did not apply to the states. This was the controlling
constitutional rule when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed
in 1866. The avowed purpose of that amendment was to make
negroes citizens with full and equal rights as citizens despite the
prior decision in Scott v. Sandford.7 6 Some, however, feel that one
of the chief objects of the provisions of the Amendment's first section,
separately or as a whole, was to make the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states.77
On the whole, interpretations of the phrases "due process of Law"
or "the law of the land" prior to 1870 placed few restrictions on the
legislatures which were not merely procedural in character. The
federal courts were seldom called on to protect either personal
privileges or property rights under the Fifth Amendment. And when
such an attempt was made it usually resulted in failure for the
litigant.78
When the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, with
the proviso that no one shall "deprive any persons of life, liberty
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws", a problem of con-
stitutional interpretation arose. The states feared this amendment
would subordinate them increasingly to federal authority. When the
Slaughter-House7 9 cases came before the Supreme Court, it being
decided that the amendment was designed primarily to protect the
negro, a strong dissent by Field J. avowed that the Amendment was
to "protect the citizens of the United States against the deprivation
of their common rights by state legislation." This dissent prompted
counsel in later cases to urge that the new Amendments were intended
to place the whole jurisprudence of the country under the protection
of the Supreme Court.80 Due process, applied in England as a guard
against executive usurpation, became in the U.S., a defense against
arbitrary legislation.81 Soon the prohibition against arbitrary acts
as a part of Due Process, was applied to many types of state legis-
lative and administrative acts.
74See generally Selected Essays on Constitutional Law (1938), vol. I at
pp. 174-206.
75 (1883), 7 Pet. 243.
76 (1957), 19 How. 393.
77 See Black J. (dissenting) in Adamson v. California (1947), 332 U.S.
46; . . . stating that the historical purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
never received full consideration and he proceeds to make applicable fully
the Fifth Amendment and all the privileges of the Bill of Rights under the
aegis of the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
78 See Murray's Lessee v. Haboker Land & Improvement (1855), 18 How.
272, but see also Hurtado v. California (1884), 110 U.S. 516.
79 (1873), 16 Wall 36 at p. 39; and see also Corwin (1909), 7 Mich. L. Rev.
643.
80 Murdock v. Memphis (1899), 20 Wall 590.
s1 Hurtado v. California, ante.
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This marked a complete departure from the Slaughter-House
philosophy of judicial tolerance of State regulation of business activity
by the use of an expanded meaning of "due process" in the Fourteenth
Amendment as a protection from state infringement of individual
liberties of the Bill of Rights.8 2 The Twining v. New Jersey8 3
decision, rejecting the compelled testimony clause of the Fifth
Amendment, was the end result of this new interpretation. This
case went so far as to declare that the "privileges or immunities"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the states to
abridge the rights enumerated in the first Eight Amendments.8 4
Later decisions have undermined this interpretation which broadly
precluded reliance on the Bill of Rights to determine what is and
what is not a "fundamental" right. For, despite Hurtado and
Twining, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment operates to protect from state invasion certain fundamental
rights safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.
(c) Recent Trends in the Interpretation of Due Process and
Their Applicability to Canada.
Turning now to the further developments under the Fourteenth
Amendment, attention is drawn to the unsuccessful effort on the
part of a minority of the Court in 1947 to reconsider the fundamental
rights interpretation of the Due Process Clause and to equate the
Fourteenth Amendment with the specific limitations of the Bill of
Rights. In Adamson v. California,5 the majority affirmed Twining
v. New JerseyS6 to the extent that privilege against self-incrimination
was not included among the basic freedoms protected by the due
process clause. Mr. Justice Black (with whom Douglas J. concurred
completely, and Murphy and Rutledge JJ. concurred partly),
vehemently attacked the use of the natural law formula as the basis
of Due Process of Law. He characterized the natural law approach
as an "incongruous excrescence" upon the Constitution, and invoked
historical sources to support his proposition that the original intention
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make the Bill of Rights appli-
cable to the states. He objects to the fundamental rights approach on
the basis that it emphasises "judicial subjectivity" in creating rights
not explicit in the Constitution and often permits the disregard of
limitations which should be emphasized.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, of the majority, interprets the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment independently of the Four-
teenth in relation to the federal government. By invoking the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court must ascertain whether the pro-
ceedings offend those canons of decency and fairness which express
82 See Kauper, Frontiers of Constitutional Liberty, (University of Michi-
gan Thomas Cooley Lectures 1956) at p. 171; and Mendolsohn (1955), 41
Va. L. Rev. 493.
83 (1908), 211 U.S. 78.
84 Ibid., at p. 83.
85 Ante footnote 77.
86 Ante footnote 83.
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the notions of justice of English speaking peoples. The importance
of this case for our purposes is that it represents an attempt to escape
from the static historical interpretation of Due Process in the
interests of broadening the bounds of personal security at the expense
of the state's power to define the procedure employed in its adminis-
tration of criminal justice.8 7
Looking at the cases and these didactic excerpts from the legal
history of the term "due process of law", one might well ask just
what the term does mean, and how far its American meaning may
be applicable to the Canadian scene. Aside from the problem of
whether Due Process of Law meant the same thing for state and
federal actions, it is submitted that the term implies the individual's
protection from the state's coercive power unless the latter is exercised
in accordance with established usages and procedure. That process
was due process which conformed to procedures established by law.
Standing in the context of the limitations in the first ten Amendments,
the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment might fairly be
expressed as meaning that all proceedings which threaten vital
interests, whether criminal or civil in character, shall conform to
procedures established by law, whether by constitution, statute or
decision, as distinguished from arbitrary assertions of power by
governmental offidials. The freezing of the due process concept of
the Fourteenth Amendment has to some extent stultified its growth
and oriented its meaning towards the broadly conceived "fair trial"
standard. Due Process of Law requires a proceeding under authority
of a general law, "a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."
From this brief summary, it should be clear that there are at
least two dangers inherent in the due process concept. One is that
Canadian courts should be careful not to equate political rights and
interests of corporate enterprise in being free from government
control of any kind, in the same way the U.S. Supreme Court did
under the so-called "substantive due process." The second danger lies
in the fundamental rights approach of Mr. Justice Frankfurther in
the Adamson case with its emphasis on "due process" as a formula
concept which is both nebulous and subjective and disregards the
other important limitations explicitly set out in the proposed Bill of
Rights and in the Criminal Code. Of paramount importance, of
course, will be the use of this concept as a basis of review of decisions
of administrative tribunals in conjunction with section 3 (c) (d) and
(e) calling for a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.
(d) Due Process of Law and Parliamentary Privilege.
There have not been for many years problems concerning the
exercise of parliamentary privileges in this country.8 8 It may be
87 See generally, Kauper, ante footnote 82.
88 See Ward, Called to the Bar of the House of Commons (1957), 35 Can.
Bar Rev. 529.
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stated with substantial accuracy that, like the Imperial Parliament,
each House of the Parliament of Canada can now define its own
privileges, determine when they have been violated, and within
certain limits, what punishments shall be inflicted. With the
exercise of these powers the courts will not directly interfere. So,
while the writ of habeas corpus is always available to a person
imprisoned by either House, the courts uniformly remand the prisoner
to custody if the return shows he is held on the order of the House.
The ground of the committment will not be inquired into, and it was
held that the return need not state in what the contempt of the
House consisted.8 9
Each House claims to be the sole judge of its own privileges and
the courts recognize this as far as undoubted privileges are con-
cerned.90 But there has been controversey between the courts and
parliament as to their respective functions in dealing with alleged
privileges. The courts have taken the view that parliament can judge
the breach, only if the privileges claimed have been found to exist
by the courts. Parliament has taken the view that the only function
of the courts is to help as occasion arises in carrying out the wishes of
Parliament.
During the Pipeline Debate in the House of Commons in 1956, the
Speaker entertained a motion that the writers of two letters to an
Ottawa newspaper, Eugene Forsey and Marjorie LeLacheur, had made
statements which were "derogatory of the dignity of parliament and
deserve the censure of this House." 91 Although the Speaker sub-
sequently ruled that the statements were "fair and reasonable com-
ment", a ruling today that the writers were in contempt of Parliament
and the issue of a Speaker's warrant for their committal until they
appeared before the Bar of the House of Commons would have raised
a nice constitutional question. If the Speaker's warrant showed cause,
the possibility of judicial review would exist. But if no cause were
shown, on the basis of the present law it is doubtful whether the
courts would be prepared to accept the warrant on an application for
habeas corpus. The nice question arises in the light of the "due pro-
cess" clause of section 2 of the new Bill of Rights: if it is held that
this phrase means determination by "superior courts" whenever an
individual is detained, the issue is settled. The writers would not have
to appear before the Bar of the House of Commons until the courts
had determined whether there had in fact been a breach of parliament-
ary privilege.
Of importance, however, is the U.S. experience in interpreting
"due process of law." This experience may be highly persuasive for
Canadian judicial interpretation. Therefore, U.S. decisions that "due
process of law" does not necessarily mean, determination by a
"superior" court may prompt reliance on the historical origins of the
89 See (1925-26), 74 Penn. L. Rev. 691.90 S toccda7e v. Hansard (1839), 9 A. & E. 1; Sheriff of Middlesex's Case(1840), 11 A. & E. 273.91 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1956, pp. 4528-90.
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phrase. Thus, according to the modes of procedure current in Eng-
land before the colonization of America, Parliament alone was judge
and jury. It should be remembered that, although the question of
parliamentary privilege has not arisen for several years, the frequent
use of parliamentary investigating committees such as the Accounts
Committee of 1958 will render the problem more important. Thus, if
the engineers or the Queen's Printer, Edmond Cloutier had failed to
appear when summoned before the Parliamentary Committee, or
having appeared proved unco-operative in answering questions, could
they be committed for contempt, without recourse to the courts first?
0. Section 2 (b) " ... protection of the law without discrimination..."
There is a striking similarity between section 2 (b) of the Bill of
Rights and the first section of the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment. The
phrase "equal protection of the law", though not in the Fifth Amend-
ment, had early been interpreted as a requirement for legislative and
executive acts by certain state and federal courts prior to 1879.92
But it was used without any clear purpose in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment so that there was little effort to apply its vague content to con-
crete cases.93 Later, the equal protection clause was found to be a
supplement to what would otherwise have been construed together to
prevent all arbitrary legislative and administrative acts, and like
certain other implied limits on legislatures, the equal protection
principle was made and essential part of the concept of due process. 94
It is suggested, however, that the phrase "the right... to the
protection of the law without discrimination..." -will provide a separ-
ate head of legislative authority embodying the protection of the
general rules governing Canadian citizens procedurally in court with-
out discrimination. In addition, it may be the means of prohibiting
discrimination on racial and religious grounds in employment prac-
tices, and in access to housing and places of public accommodation
just as the Fourteenth Amendment was used by the U.S. Supreme
Court to invalidate the segregation laws in the Southern states of the
U.S., requiring separate accommodation for negroes and the like.95
Although the federal Parliament has passed a Statute forbidding dis-
crimination against any person on the grounds of race, creed, colour,
nationality, ancestry, place of origin and sex, it is limited in its ap-
plication to employees under its jurisdiction. Therefore the practical
value of section 2 (b) of the proposed Bill of Rights will depend on the
constitutional basis of the statute in toto or in part.
In most fields, the subject of discrimination ostensibly comes
within the power of the provinces. Some provinces have passed acts
similar to the federal Fair Employment Practices Act.96 The only
92 Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396.93 The Slaughter House Cases, ante at p 89.
94 Connolly 'v. Union Sewer Pipe do. 184 U.S. 540; Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312 at p. 322, per Taft C.J.
95See Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S. 483; Bolling v.
Sharpe (1954), 347 U.S. 447.
96 (1952-53), 2-3 Eliz. II, (Can.) c. 19.
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comprehensive statute is the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights At 97
which prohibits discrimination "because of race, creed, religion, colour
or ethnic or national origin" in six areas-employment, carrying on
business, owning land, accommodations in public places, membership
in professional and trade organizations, and education. The Ontario
Fair Accommodations Practices Act forbids the denial "to any person
of the accommodation services or facilities available in any place
to which the public is customarily admitted."9 8
Aside from the general consideration referred to earlier providing
for the constitutional basis of the Bill of Rights under the residuary
power of the federal parliament, section 2(b) may be specially pro-
tected by the heretofore undeveloped legislative head of "rights of
citizenship." A separate status of citizenship was considered by Rand
J. in Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern Ltd.), when he observed as obiter:
"The first and fundamental characteristic of the constitutional act was
the creation of a single political organization of subjects of His Majesty
within the geographical area of the Dominion, the basic postulate of which
was the initiation of a Canadian citizenship. Citizenship is membership
in a state; and in the citizens inhere those rights and duties, the correla-
tives of allegiance and protection, which are basic to that status.
The British North America Act makes no express allocation of citizen-
ship as the subject-matter of legislation to either the Dominion or the
provinces; but as it lies at the foundations of the political organization
as its character is national, and by implication of head 25, section 91,
"Naturalization and Aliens, it is to be found within the residual powers
of the Dominion:" Canada Temperance case at p. 205. Whatever else
might have been said prior to 1913, the Statute of Westminister, coupled
with the declarations of constitutional relations of 1926, out of which itissued, creating in substance a sovereignty, concludes the question." 9 9
Then Rand J. expressed the opinion that "a province cannot prevent a
Canadian from entering it except, conceivably, in temporary circum-
stances, for some local reason, as, for example, health.' '1 00
In an excellent commentary 101 on the substantive implications of
Rand J.'s Winner opinion, it is suggested that the reason for creating
a separate "citizenship status" was the desire to secure to civil
liberties "an independent constitutional value"'1 02 in order to give an
"appropriate constitutional form to matters which because of their
unique character have a unity of interest and significance, extending
equally to all parts of the Dominion. ' 10 3 Surely the right of the In-
dividual to the protection of the law without discrimination "is a
matter which from its inherent nature" is of concern to the Dominion
as a whole? If thIs is so, it is submitted that section 2(b) of Bill of
Rights will have an overriding effect on provincial enactments abridg-
ing or infringing it. This is true whether the section is characterized
97 1947, c. 35 (Sask.).
981954, c. 157 (Ont.); and see generally Bowker, Protection of Basic
Rights and Liberties (1954-7), 2 U.B.C. Legal Notes, 281 at 302.
99 [19511 S.C.R. 887 at pp. 918-9; and c.f. Reference re Alberta Statutes,[19381 S.C.R. 100 at p. 149 per Cannon J.
100 Ibid., at p. 920.
101 Price, Mr. Justice Rand and Canadian Citizenship (1958), 16 Fac. of
L.R. 16; and see Roncarefli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. per Rand J. (unre-
ported as yet).
lo2 Ibid., at p. 20.
10 3 Ibid., at p. 24.
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separately as an incident of citizenship or on a broader application
under the residuary power of section 91 of the British North America
Act.
Laws against discrimination by private persons obviously create
extensive problems of enforcement. Even the most ardent advocates
of explicit protection for civil liberties are opposed to such laws on the
ground that prejudice and discrimination cannot be preirented by laws,
as morality cannot be legislated. One important consideration should
be pointed out. Civil liberties generally are negative in character,
aimed at securing freedom from something. Therefore, positive legi-
slation should first promote social justice by ensuring certain minima
of well-being below which people should not be allowed to fall. In
this way, racial and religious discrimination Will be mitigated by pro-
tecting the individual from outside restraints and at the same time
providing equality of opportunity.'0 4
(3) Section 3 of the Bill of Bights
This section for the most part spells out the legal protections that
exist under the common law respecting arrest, trial and detention.105
Much of this part of the Bill of Rights is codified by the Criminal Code.
The salient features of the section are the provisions for the general
right to counsel in section 3 (b) (ii) and the right to counsel when
appearing before an administrative tribunal in section 3 (c). Although
the Criminal Code and the various voluntary legal aid systems enable
the indigent to be represented by counsel, this does not compel the
court to provide counsel. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Bill of
Rights enables the appointment of counsel for an accused in all federal
cases, capital cases in state courts and lesser state crimes.106 In fact,
the right to aid of counsel in federal criminal proceedings under the
Sixth Amendment extends to every phase of appeal, including the pre-
liminary phase of obtaining permission to appeal. Perhaps section
3 (b) (Ii) will be interpreted so that our courts must provide counsel
in all criminal matters?107
D. The Value of a Statutory Enactment on Civil Liberties
Part II of the Bill of Rights deals with civil liberties in the event
of "real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection." As it stands
now the War Measures'08 Act gives to the federal cabinet power to
authorize whatever may be thought necessary in the interests of
security. Among the powers specified are "censorship and control
of publications and writing, communications" and "arrest, detention,
exclusion and deportation." All of this would be done by orders-in-
council with the force of law and if any of them were violated the
Cabinet could without reference to any court, prescribe its own penal-
ties up to five years or five thousand dollars, or both.
104 For a survey of other discriminatory statutes, see Ryan, More About
a Bill of Rights (1958), 1 Can. Bar J. 74 at p. 75.10 5 See generally, Bowker, ante at p. 313.10 6 Anderson v. Heinze (1958), 258 F. 2d. 479.
107 For the protections under the Criminal Code, see Ryan, ante at p. 76.
108 R.S.C. c. 288.
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Section 6 of the War Measures Act is to be repealed so that the
proclamation declaring a state of war can be debated and if both
Houses of Parliament resolve that the Proclamation be revoked the
Bill of Rights cannot be abrogated by the government. It seems to
me that these provisions might be inherently dangerous to their in-
fluence on civil liberties in time of peace. Implicit in section 6 is the
idea that the government can supervise the use of civil liberties. What
then is to prevent a government in time of peace from making other
insidious inroads on the use of civil liberties under the guise of
protective legislation. The essence of civil liberties is that govern-
ment agrees to keep its hands strictly off them-to preserve them
rather than supervise their use. While they must be reserved to
people, they cannot be left subject to the whims of majority opinion.
Individual rights can best be protected against the vagaries of public
opinion only through the courts. But in the light of the confused
judicial interpretation of the constitutional basis of civil liberties,
it is obvious that the courts themselves need guidance. The best form
for this to take is as a Bill of Rights imbedded in the Constitution and
thus made part of our national birth certificate.
Even if the Bill of Rights were specially buttressed as part of the
British North America Act, there are still those who would oppose
any codification of our fundamental freedoms. 09 It is better in Pro-
fessor Clokie's opinion to view civil liberty "as flowing from numerous
aspects of a well-balanced constitutional system of government." In
his view "it is also better to have parliament draft appropriate laws
now, even if misconceived and ill-judged, and establish the requisite
procedural machinery, no matter how defective, than have these in-
troduced, as they have been and will be in a haphazard, hasty and
perhaps violent manner when necessity requires their speedy adoption.
This is the way of constitutional wisdom and the guarantee of the con-
tinuance of our liberties."" 0
Implicit in these observations is the feeling that the only effective
guarantee of freedom is a vigilant public opinion. For that reason, so
the argument runs, civil liberties are better protected in Britain than
in the United States. It should be remembered, however, that Canada
and the United States lack the homogeneity and traditions of the
British people. The existence of a federal system makes the situation
more complex, especially in Canada where it is still uncertain what the
distribution of legislative power is between the federal and provincial
governments in respect to our baic freedoms. Although civil liberties
have been traditionally better guarded in Britain, it is also true that
civil liberties would have suffered severer abridgment in the United
States," without Bills of Rights in the federal and state constitutions.
109 McD. Clokie, The Preservation of Civil Liberties (1947), 12 Can. J.
Ec. Pol. Sci. at p. 394.
10McD. Clokie, Emergency Powers and Civil Liberties (1947), 13 Can.
J. Ec. Pol. Sci. 334 at p. 394.II See generally, Corry Democratic Government and Politics (1952), and
McCloskey, Essays in Constitutional Law (1957).
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The prime advantage of a written Bill of Rights is its educational
value. This is especially true in a young country like Canada to
which are gravitating large numbers 'of persons of diverse origins and
of little or no tradition of effective civil liberties. A Charter of basic
liberties would be useful in teaching mutual respect and tolerance. In
this regard, the proposed Bill of Rights is open to criticism. If a
Charter of Liberties is to be of truly educational value, its language
should be simple yet imaginative. It should contain salient phrases
which are easily comprehended and catch the imagination of young
and old alike. Unfortunately, the proposed Bill falls short of this ideal.
It is set out like an elaborate blueprint, lacking even a decent preamble.
This is one area where amendments might improve the language of
the Bill and thus enhance its educational value. In addition, surely
both the educational value and practical value of the proposed statute
would have been greater if provision for some sort of sanctions had
been made. Personal remedies in the form of injunctions and damages
would certainly not be out of place. Finally, the content of the Bill
might be criticized for its failure to take note of the change, in most
Western countries, from laissez-faire to a more collectivist organiza-
tion of society based on the principles of the Welfare State. 1-2 This
omission is even more shameful when one remembers that Canada
was a signatory to the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights.
Actual protection of civil liberties in practice is essentially a
judicial function. To often basic values are lost sight of by the courts
in their reliance on Austinian formalism and the canons of constitu-
tional interpretation. Codification of fundamental freedoms would
render the necessary recognition, provided it is in its proper con-
stitutional form, of those "preferred freedoms" which are necessary
for the working of the "body politic of the Dominion." 3 Large policy
considerations confront the Supreme Court, particularly in the dis-
charge of its task to protect the fundamental rights of the individual.
For this reason, the Supreme Court if it is to maintain its role in a
democratic society, cannot divorce itself from the climate of thinking
that determines the trends in Canadian political, social and economic
life, although the Court itself is an important influence on these trends.
The Supreme Court is now in a favourable position since the final
abolition of the appeal from Canadian courts to the Privy Council to
reappraise the hierarchy of constitutional values by departing from
formalistic doctrinal concepts embodied in prior decisions especially
in the field of public law.114 The court has open to it a variety of
means to care for those interests which in its opinion demand special
judicial protection. Surely those "preferred freedoms" enumerated
in the proposed Bill are worthy of the vigilant protection of the
Supreme Court, especially if they are violated by those provinces
which have in the past done so much to undermine civil liberties.
If the proposed Bill is questioned either in part or in toto would this
12See McWhinney, A Bill of Rights (1958), 5 McGill L.J. 36 at p. 46.
113 Saumur v. The City of Quebec, ante, at p. 386.11 4 See generally McWhinney, Judicial Review In the English Speaking
World (1956), chapter 1.
N.B. This article was completed before the March, 1959, issue of the
Can. Bar Rev. was available.
[VOL. I
CiviZ Liberties and the Canadian Constitution
not be a splendid opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to
ensure a uniform standard of freedom to all by upholding the Bill of
Rights as a valid federal enactment? It is in the area of Public law,
then, that judicial determination of the interests to be served and the
objectives to be attained can play its paramount role.
APPENDIX "'A"
BILL 0-60
An Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and
House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows:
PART I
BILL OF RIGHTS
1. This Part may be cited as the Canadian Bill of Rights.
2. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there
have always existed and shall continue to exist the following human
rights and fundamental freedoms, namely,
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security of the
person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be
deprived thereof except by due process of law;
(b) the right of the individual to protection of the law without
discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour,
religion or sex;
(c) freedom of religion;
(d) freedom of speech;
(f) freedom of assembly and association; and
(f) freedom of the press.
3. All the Acts of the Parliament of Canada enacted before or
after the commencement of this Part, all orders, rules and regulations
thereunder, and all laws in force in Canada or in any part of Canada
at the commencement of this Part that are subject to be repealed,
abolished or altered by the Parliament of Canada, shall be so con-
strued and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe or to author-
ize the abrogation, abridgement or infringement of any of the rights
or freedoms recognized by this Part, and, without limiting the gener-
ality of the foregoing, no such Act, order, rule, regulation or law
shall be construed or applied so as to,
(a) impose or authorize the imposition of torture, or cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) deprive a person who has been arrested or detained
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(i) of the right to be informed promptly of the reason for
his arrest or detention,
(ii) of the right to retain and instruct counsel without
delay, or
(iii) of the remedy by way of habeas corpus for the deter-
mination of the validity of his detention and for his
release if the detention is not lawful;
(c) authorize a court, tribunal, commission, board or other
authority to compel a person to give evidence if he is denied
counsel or other constitutional safeguards;
(d) deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice for the determina-
tion of his rights and obligations; or
(e) deprive a person of the right to a fair and public hearing by
an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination
of any criminal charge against him.
4. The Minister of Justice shall, in accordance with such regula-
tions as may be prescribed by the Governor in Council, examine every
proposed regulation submitted in draft form to the Clerk of the Privy
Council pursuant to the Regulations Act and every Bill introduced in
the House of Commons, to ensure that the purposes and provisions of
this Part in relation thereto are fully carried out.
PART II
5. Nothing in Part I shall be construed to abrogate or abridge
any human right or fundamental freedom not enumerated therein
that may have existed in Canada at the commencement of this Act.
6. Section 6 of the War Measures Act is repealed and the follow-
ing substituted therefor:
"6.(1) Sections 3, 4 ai~d 5 shall come into force only upon the issue
of a proclamation of the Governor in Council declaring that war, In-
vasion or insurrection, real or apprehended, exists.(2) A proclamation declaring that war, invasion or insurrection, real
or apprehended, exists shall be laid before Parliament forthwith after Its
issue, or, if Parliament is then not sitting, within the first fifteen days
next thereafter that Parliament is sitting.(3) Where a proclamation has been laid before Parliament pursuant
to subsection (2), a notice of motion in either House signed by ten mem-
bers thereof and made in accordance with the rules of that House within
ten days of the day the proclamation was laid before Parliament, praying
that the proclamation be revoked, shall be debated in that House at the
first convenient opportunity within the four sitting days next after the
day the motion in that House was made.(4) If both Houses of Parliament resolve that the proclamation be
revoked, it shall cease to have effect, and sections 3, 4 and 5 shall cease
to be in force until those sections are again brought into force by a
further proclamation but without prejudice to the previous operation of
those sections or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or any offence
committed or any penalty or forfeiture or punishment incurred(5) Any act or thing done or authorized or any order or regulation
made under the authority of this Act, shall be deemed not to be an abro-
gation, abridgement or infringement of any right or freedom recognized
by the Canadian Bill of Rights."
Section 6 of the War Measures Act now reads as follows:
"6. The provisions of the three sections last preceding shall only be
in force during war, invasion, or insurrection, real or apprehended."
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